(no subject)

[ravencallscrows]

OK, this is going to be a long, non-personal post which most of you won't want to read, so i'm hiding it behind a
Ha! You looked anyway.
Well, it's not too late to stop. This is going to go into one of those interests of mine which seems to be a unique one in the LJ world- post-Soviet Russian market economics.
Actually, it'll be more of a historical/political overview of the development of a market economy, something which Russia has never really successfully developed on a national scale.
Starting in the 1880s, the Russian nation was showing signs of becoming a world power. With the largest population in Europe (nearly equal to the next three largest- Germany, Austria-Hungary and France combined), and vast landholdings, there was an incredible untapped potential. Industrialization was late developing- in 1880, Russia was just over a ninth as industrialized per capita as Great Britain, but showing signs of taking off- by 1913, it had doubled; but still lagged significantly behind even second-tier European powers like Austria and Italy.
Similarly, industrial potential, as defined by Bairoch (essentially an index of industrialization, energy consumption, and production of certain key elements used in much manufacturing like pig-iron [before 1890] or steel [afterwards]) grew- roughly trebling in the same period, although by 1910 Russia had only equalled 1880 Britain.
Militarily, in terms of men-under-arms, she was without peer- a force of 1.3 million regular troops at the outbreak of World War I, with 5 millions claimed as reservists; and with similarly unparalled expenditures on militaria. Unfortunately, many of these troops were under-trained and even more inadequately equipped.
Railway construction, largely backed by France, increased dramatically from 1900 through 1915. Industrial output rose markedly, as did international trade- nearly trebling from 1890 to 1914. Unfortunately, although the number of people working in manufacturing had risen dramatically, it still comprised less than two percent of the population as a whole, and many of those who did work did so for foreign-held corporations.
This was still largely a peasant society- in 1914, over eighty percent of the population derived its livelyhood from agriculture- and an impoverished one at that.
Herein are the seeds of revolution- high military expenditures supported by incredibly high taxation (estimated at fifty percent), low spending on social programmes, poor living conditions, especially in the cities. This led to an increase in strikes and domestic unrest, which provoked police responses, which only seemed to create a vicious cycle, and ever increasing levels of general discontent.
Governmental attempts to check this proved counterproductive- interior minister Stolypin breaking up the peasant communities after 1908, which either caused fresh unrest by groups wanting to maintain their communal systems, or the newly independent farmers to fall into bankruptcy.
There is a brief summary of the sociopolitical tinderbox, which became aggrevated by the outbreak of World War I, and fueled the revolution. The war itself would nearly bankrupt the nation, and resulted in Russia's exit from the global conflict, only to face an internal one.
In the post-revolution era, changes were again drastic- by 1930, industrial output no longer lagged badly behind Germany and Britain; the post-Great Patriotic War focus on the military-industrial complex brought immense growth through much of the "hot" period of the Cold War, much of which was driven by trade in military goods with Russia's "socialist allies" in the Warsaw Pact.
Geopolitical climatic changes brought the Cold War to an end- driven by remarkable events in their own right like the changes in Poland brought on by Walesa and the Solidarity movement, the end of partition in Germany, and the election of Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia.
Inexorably, these events mirrored internal stresses which led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, spurred by both internal crises like the lack of consumer goods and the ethnic divisions which divided the republics.
By the point the Baltic republics declared their independence, the slide toward division was irrevocable. With division came another influx of foreign capital, similar to the one in the 1880-1914 period. The internal manufacturing was still largely focused on the military-industrial complex, but many of the items produced therein were products in demand in the international markets, providing for at least some export revenue which could be used to drive development.
There are still many obstacles to overcome- in the void of order and strong leadership, organized crime has come to play a bigger role than it probably ever did in New York, Chicago and Las Vegas combined.
The gap between those who have and those who have not is still almost as broad as it was in the czarist times between the nobility and the serfs, but it's not unheard of for individuals to prosper without illegal means. The transition is coming- a market is evolving, often in small ways- exports of traditionally Russian goods and the like; franchising in the larger cities of internationally recognized businesses, but the process is not going to be an overnight one.
Stolypin wrote in 1909 "Give the state twenty years of internal and external peace, and you will not recognize Russia." Given his failures at ameliorating internal problems, may these words prove to be prophetic, and may this generation see those twenty years.

Comments

[stephanielynch.livejournal.com]

So mote it be, vanya.

[gwynn-aaron.livejournal.com]

Very interesting. Will you be expanding upon this subject or is that all you had to say? If you are planning on writing more then I will look forward to reading it.

[wingedelf.livejournal.com]

There's probably a dry tome of economics, history, military and political science in it. I'd need to do some research first, though.